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EXCLUSIVELY FOR EVERYONE 






For most people using an advertising slogan as the title for a philosophical paper is going to 
seem, at best, provocative, and at worst, simply cynical.   However, this kind of cynical 
provocation is precisely what I want to address.   That is, Marks and Spencer's tagline 
'exclusively for everyone' is an affront to rational thought, but this is also the motive for its 
effectiveness.   Rather than simply stating what's on offer, it plays to our dreams; rather than 
simply offering to match our expectations, it promises to exceed them.   Moreover, it does so 
by bringing together two qualities we desire as customers—open, friendly service and elite 
luxury—that are, nevertheless, contradictory in practice.   For M&S's products to appeal to 
'everyone', they must reject the kind of exacting discernment that would make them 
'exclusive'—as the word itself suggests, for these products to be 'exclusive', they must exclude 
certain preferences and tastes.   As such, what the slogan implausibly suggests is that the 
retailer is able to satisfy both the taste of the most philistine and the snobbery of the most 
disdainful.    
Moreover—and this is part of the cynical provocation—this is precisely what art expects to 
achieve by means of aesthetic experience.   Like massmarket retailers such as M&S, aesthetic 
objects claim to square the circle of universal appeal and distinctive quality.   As productive of 
aesthetic experience, they also undertake to exclude the mediocre from their ranks without 
becoming simply the preserve of an elite few.   As a consequence, any theory that draws upon 
aesthetic experience is confronted by the dilemma of these contradictory demands.1 






Therefore, the dilemma of aesthetic experience is, as the notion suggests, a double bind.   On 
the one hand, aesthetic experience is universal; it is 'for everyone'.   It is, to use the language of 
Kant, the product of an aesthetic judgement of taste, 'which can make a rightful claim upon 
everyone's assent'.2  If it does not possess this universality, then it loses its unique character 
and significance.   For what makes aesthetic experience so significant—so revolutionary 
even—is that all of us have the capacity for it simply by being human.   Because based in the 
most fundamental aspect of our existence—our sensorial being-in-the-world—aesthetic 
experience offers the hope of a common bond, where otherwise there might be nothing but 
misunderstanding.  It is in order to conceptualise this bond that Kant proposes that aesthetic 
satisfaction must 'be regarded as grounded on what [one] can presuppose in every other 
person'.3  It is what explains John Dewey's attempt to understand aesthetic experience on the 
basis of an experience.  That is, rather than start by assuming the distinctiveness of aesthetic 
experience, Dewey does the exact opposite and emphasizes its commonality with experiences 
as mundane as 'that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship'.4  However, as we recognize 
in Dewey's subsequent embarrassment to distinguish aesthetic experience from experience 
more generally, the claim to commonality and universality has its pitfalls.  Complete openness 
risks inaugurating a 'come as you are' affair, where aesthetic experience is no more than the 
taste of the lowest common denominator, the taste of the massmarket.  If aesthetic experience 
is indeed 'for everyone', it exposes us to everyone's taste.   
Thus and on the other hand, the universality of aesthetic experience must be qualified.  It 
in art and its audiences.  Basing himself on his 'conception of art as the focus of a community', he posits a 
duality in our appreciation of art that reflects a duality in our trans-personal relations. 
2  Kant (1790), §7, 47.  Someone might protest that Kant does not propose a notion of aesthetic experience, 
which is true.  Nevertheless, it is important to trace the latter notion back to its roots in Kantian aesthetics, 
because only in this fashion can we grasp the fullness of its dilemma.  Shortly we will address differences 
between notions of aesthetic experience as they develop in the twentieth century. 
3  Ibid., §6, 46.  This is  not to obscure the fact that Kant does indeed engage the other half of the dilemma, 
namely that aesthetic experience must also be exclusive.  The very fact that Kant develops his aesthetics 
upon the notion of the judgement of taste evokes this exclusivity.  As he says, the 'highest model' is an 
'archetype of taste…which everyone must produce in himself and according to which he mu st judge every 
object of taste, every example of judgement by taste, and even the taste of everyone'  (§17, 68-9). 
4  Dewey (1934), 37. 
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must acknowledge some notion of discernment.  In Kant, this appears in the notion of taste 
itself, whose 'highest model' is an 'archetype of taste…which everyone must produce in himself 
and according to which he must judge every object of taste, every example of judgement by 
taste, and even the taste of everyone.'5  Just the same, emphasizing discernment has its costs, 
as well.  When Monroe Beardsley argues that it 'takes a greater capacity [for aesthetic 
experience] to respond to Shakespeare than to Graham Greene,' that '[p]eople sometimes give 
up Tchaikovsky's symphonies for Haydn's but they do not…give up Haydn for Tchaikovsky', 
we are as much in our rights to question his judgements as we are to wonder at the limited 
scope of his examples.  That is, without exception— and with almost depressing 
predictability—everyone he acclaims are European males.  Now I admit, multicultural criticism 
can be tedious, and yet if we get beyond the accusations of discrimination—for discrimination, 
at least, can be addressed by inclusion—what we perceive is how much it reveals about our 
ignorance.  In a context where Beardsley wants to advertise none other than the refinement of 
his taste, he cannot help but also reveal the limitedness of his aesthetic experience.  And this is 
not a fault that is specific to Beardsley.  Quite the contrary, it is very likely that most of us, 
even with our smattering of women's literature, Chinese painting and Japanese theatre, would 
end up looking much more aesthetic experience impoverished than Beardsley.  As such, we 
should recognise that the appeal to aesthetic experience is inherently also the exposure to those 
factors that limit it—whether cultural, political, financial or simply practical—and that to the 
extent that the notion is used to justify canons, institutions and the like, it cannot avoid also 
justifying those limitations, and thereby forming the basis for elitism.  In other words, if 
aesthetic experience is exclusive, it cannot avoid excluding. 
So what to do?  Now obviously one horn of the dilemma is on hand to parry the excesses 
of the other—just as discernment serves as a response to the appeal of flattering entertainment, 
inclusion responds to the threat of exclusivity—but these trade-offs still leave open the very 
important question of where to strike the balance.  Where one does this very much depends 
upon one's perception of the respective dangers.  When Kant first formulated his notion of 
aesthetic judgement, the mediocrity of commercial culture was not on hand to temper his 
enthusiasm for aesthetic universality—rather it was the French Revolution and its promises of 
5  Kant (1790), §17, 68-9. 
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democratic liberation that were very much in the air—but one hundred and fifty years later, 
Beardsley chooses to overturn Kantian universalism in response to very real commercial 
encroachments.  Moreover, this development in the notion of aesthetic experience is important 
enough to demand further explanation, for it marks an important philosophical impasse, one 




This impasse concerns the relation between aesthetic experience and the objects that give rise 
to it.  As we have already seen, the term 'aesthetic object' is really not much more than a thinly 
veiled reference to art objects, and yet by retaining the notion of aesthetics, there is the hope of 
maintaining a link to wider experience.  What the impasse involves is no less than the 
foreclosure on this hope.  For when Beardsley commits himself to the elucidation of an 
'objective definition' of aesthetic objects, he does so at the cost of aesthetic experience itself.  
Such a result would have been predicted by Kant.  That is, even though the latter does indeed 
note that we 'speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a characteristic of the object', he warns 
that this is only a manner of speaking.  Because, if beauty does not involve 'the representation 
of the object to the subject', its universality will say nothing about our common humanity.6  As 
such, when Beardsley distinguishes aesthetic objects from other perceptual objects, not by 
their 'relations to people, but by their own characteristics',7 he severs humanistic links in favour 
of cultural distinctions.  His 'objective definition' is, as the very name indicates, the result of a 
concern with objects, and not with the people whose enjoyment of them might have moral and 
political consequences.  This is more than simply a bias in favour of objects over their 
subjective reception;8 this is a bypassing of the dilemma of aesthetic experience altogether. 
That is, Beardsley's notion of aesthetic experience is indeed the 'phantom' that George 
Dickie says it is, even if for very different reasons.9  Whereas Dickie questions whether an 
experience (called 'aesthetic') could indeed be coherent or unified as Beardsley wants it to be, 
6  Kant (1790), §6, 46. 
7  Beardsley (1951), 63. 
8  I am speaking most particularly about the assumptions Kant must make about the form of human 
faculties in order to develop his notion of aesthetic judgement. 
9  This is a reference to George Dickie's essay 'Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience'. 
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we can question whether the latter's aesthetics implies any experience whatsoever.  Beardsley 
does not simply locate the force of aesthetics within aesthetic objects, he reclaims the existence 
of such objects even against  our experience of them.  For him 'a painting never seen by 
anyone [still] has aesthetic value'.10  The problem with such a view is not so much that it 
beggars belief, but that it begs the question of why we bother with aesthetic objects at all.  
Because his theory does not require that aesthetic experience be 'for everyone'—quite simply, 
because it is indifferent to our experience, it breeds indifference towards the very aesthetic 
objects it champions.  Its very success in overcoming the dilemma of aesthetic experience is its 
failure to grasp why there was any dilemma in the first place. 
In this light, Danto's notion of an 'artworld' can be seen much less as a repudiation of 
aesthetic experience than a re-engagement with its dilemma.  When Danto claims that '[t]o see 
something as art requires something that the eye cannot decry—an atmosphere of artistic 
theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld',11 he is not rejecting our aesthetic 
experience.  Quite the contrary, he is re-establishing the grounds that make it possible.  
Without the dilemma of an experience that both reaffirms our community with others and 
threatens to alienate us from those who don't share in it, there is nothing at stake in our 
reception of works of art.  Only as long as aesthetic experience remains problematic, only as 
long as our aesthetic experience makes us wonder about that of others, do works of art have 
anything more than novelty value.  If art is not simply to be a glorified form of fashion, it must 
acknowledge what Dewey emphasizes: namely, that life 'is a thing of histories', and that as 
such, experience only occurs to the extent that it engages our personal and collective 




It is the experience of this resistance that Danto brings out in his writings on art.  If we simply 
take one example, the 'Manhattan Telephone Directory for 1980', we start to grasp Danto's 
engagement with the dilemma of aesthetic experience.  This example is a thought experiment 
10  Beardsley (1951), 531. 
11  Danto (1964), 580. 
12  Dewey (1934), 35 and 53, respectively. 
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about the nature of interpretation, which would seem to make it a poor choice in an 
examination of aesthetic experience.  It would seem that one would need to choose a work of 
art.  However, not only is the Telephone Directory precisely the example that Joseph Margolis 
identifies in his early recognition of Danto's refutational power vis-a-vis Beardsley,13 but also 
the choice of a banal object, a product of modern commercial culture, is very much suited to 
the task of illuminating the dilemma of aesthetic experience.  For as we have said, this dilemma 
occurs as an unstable balancing act between contradictory demands, and thus in order to 
strike a sustainable equilibrium, there must be some sort of urgency in the philosophical appeal 
to aesthetic experience.  Only if sufficiently motivated can aesthetic objects provide a focus—
to use the language of Ted Cohen—for an 'intimate community', can they forge—to use the 
language of Danto himself—an artworld.14  In the case of the latter, the concern that motivates 
the appeal to art and our experience of it is a concern with modern commercial culture.  The 
very title of Danto's philosophy of art, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, evokes 
this concern.  For him what is at stake in art is the possibility of a transfigurative experience, 
which would allow us to see beyond the commonplace.  Some might dismiss this experience as 
obscurantist, but quite honestly it is no greater a folly of faith than the belief that we are willing 
to eschew the possibility of such experiences altogether.15 
What Danto demonstrates time and time again, then, is the degree to which the task of 
perceiving works of art engages our conception of the world.  When Danto holds up the 
Manhattan Telephone Directory for 1980, and proposes to see it as a 'piece of paper 
sculpture, a folio of prints, a novel, a poem,' or even 'the score for a musical composition',16 he 
transfigures this commonplace object before our very mind's eyes.  'If it is a novel, we may 
deplore the exiguities of plot, but hardly if it is sculpture, since sculptures have no plots'.17  In 
other words, in every manifestation of the telephone directory, art theory not only identifies 
13  Margolis (1980), 1-15. 
14  Ted Cohen (1993) has worked substantially with the role of aesthetic experience in community 
formation.  As he says in 'High and Low Art, and High and Low Audiences', 'works of art…are sometimes 
foci for intimate communities.  Such a community is constituted by its shared response to something…and 
the sense of community derives from its members' awareness that they share'.  It is also significant that 
Cohen does not limit this possibility to just works of art. 
15  As Beardsley himself says in defending aesthetic experience later in his life, 'it is not as though we were 
shutting our eyes to reality by resolving to continue our aesthetic dialogue, but rather that we refuse to let 
certain important things be lost sight of' (1982, 77) 
16  Danto (1981), 136. 
17  Ibid.   
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what kind of work we are dealing with, but also, and critically, achieves this identification by 
reference to perceptual characteristics.  Without art theory, we do not have access to the sort 
of artworld, do not have the sort of consensus needed to determine which perceptual 
characteristics are important in a work, and the degree of their importance.  As such, without 
art theory, our experience can never have the coherence needed to be aesthetic.  Only with art 
theory can we face up to the world of the commonplace, and harbour hope for something 
more and different. 
However, what this also means is that, like Beardsley before him, Danto's greatest concern 
is with the well-being of art faced with the overwhelming presence of the commonplace.  The 
theory's openness to community formation, therefore—its notion of an artworld—is qualified.  
As Richard Shusterman has emphasized in his 'pragmatic aesthetics',18 it is conceived precisely 
as against the world of popular culture, and as exclusionary of its objects.  The insight afforded 
Danto by Warhol's Brillo Box is precisely that 'the Brillo people cannot manufacture art', and 
that 'Warhol cannot but  make artworks'.19  In Danto's thinking, our aesthetic experience, 
guided as it is by philosophy, can and must exclude certain kinds of appreciation of the 
commonplace. 
But is this really necessary?  Do we really need philosophy to protect us from our taste?  
Or in the terms of this essay, is it really the universality of aesthetic experience that poses its 
most fatal menace?  For, as Danto's own example of Brillo Box incisively illustrates, when art 
and consumer goods are placed side by side, art usually fares very well in the comparison.  
Now art theory clearly plays its role in this, as Danto argues, but we also must suspect that no 
amount of theory could ever transfigure objects that did not participate in their own 
transfiguration.  That is, if we return to the thought experiment of the Manhattan Telephone 
Directory, what we cannot help but notice is the fact that we are not making art.  Like the 
similar thought experiments we undertake in museums and out and about, we fail to transfigure 
radiators and doorknobs into works of art by sheer bloody-mindedness.  Rather, and as 
Beardsley himself would want to interject right now, aesthetic experience involves an 
objective dimension—a dimension that makes objects 'speak to us', for lack of a better 
18  See in particular, Shusterman's critique of Danto (1993) where he offers a reinterpretation of Brillo Box 
that would contest the 'theology of art' that separates art from life. 
19  Danto (1964), 580. 
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phrase—that no amount of receptivity or theory can ever overcome.  And even though Danto 
would almost certainly not disagree with this point, it still has implications that reach beyond his 
theory.  For if works of art aren't so dangerously threatened by the commonplace, then what 




Moreover, the danger of this exclusivity is so well-recognised that it has become memorialised 
in popular caricature: in the figures of the black clad jet set, who look down their noses at the 
majority just as happy to stay at home and watch TV.  As this parody drives home, exclusivity 
is dual edged.  The more the denizens of an artworld exclude the pleasures of the majority, the 
more they risk marginalizing the very artworld they champion.  And history bears this out, 
because what has happened to the artworld is that it has traded the fervour of a Vienna at the 
turn of the century for a retreat into insitutions on the model of the Tate museums in London.  
And even though these institutions eschew elitism and pride themselves on making art as 
accessible as possible—and one need only to stand in the thronged Turbine Hall on a Saturday 
afternoon to measure this success—their very aim of accessibility is their implicit admission that 
their first  role is to protect art's exclusivity and difference from common commercial 
endeavours.  As such, they cannot help but suggest that aesthetic experience is so precious 
and fragile as to risk being smothered by the direct light of day. 
However, isn't it precisely the opposite that is the case—or more exactly, that precisely the 
opposite is also the case?  Isn't it the case that aesthetic experience is as much a victim of its 
robustness as it is its fragility?  Isn't it the case that one of the things that we are most certain of 
is our  own aesthetic experience, that experience which is exclusively our own?  If it is 
reasonable to talk about aesthetic experience at all, it must be because we are confident that 
we have had some.  And yet how do we prove it?   One approach is to look for objects that 
nearly all of us appreciate, with the notion of using them as demonstrative evidence; however, 
what we quickly realise is that the best source of such objects is not art, but nature.   
This, again, would be no surprise to Kant.  He is well-known for praising the incontestable 
beauty of flowers.  Similarly, Adorno is equally in his rights to suggest that 'no feeling 
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person…fails to be moved by the sound of a robin after a rain shower'.20  And if someone 
were tempted to reject these observations as evidence of incurable romanticism, he would fail 
to acknowledge to what degree his own dismissal, most often in favour of reason and logic, is 
itself a manifestation of romanticism's own hope: the hope of an overcoming of our individual 
experience—the fact that our particular experience is indeed exclusively our own—in favour 
of universality.  Just as science turns to nature in search of universal laws, romanticism turns to 
natural beauty as a model for universal aesthetic experience.  As Hegel puts it, the romantic 
artist draws 'into himself the whole breadth of nature as the surroundings and locality of 
spirit'.21  For the latter, the experience of nature is a brush with pristine sensuality, with pure 
perception devoid of any preconceptions or theories, directly analogous to the type of pure 
aesthetic experience of works of art theorized by Beardsley.   
But to hold that one's aesthetic object is pure appearance is to reclaim the experience of 
pure presence, of an experience that is direct and without mediation by history, or culture, or 
society.  Not only does such an experience delve into the realms of theology and mysticism, 
but as Adorno points out, it is also self-contradictory.  As pure appearance such an object 
could never fully appear before our eyes.  Even as we turned our gaze toward it, we would 
have already lost sight of the first appearing of its appearance, its appearance as appearance.  
In this sense, romanticism—whether of nature or of a naturalised art—brings into doubt the 
very experience it wants to champion.   
As a consequence and as Adorno himself argues, we must insist upon the mediateness of all 
experience, with the implication that it is only through culture that the seemingly universal 
experience of nature—both first and second—can hope to become aesthetic, and thereby 
protest its fundamental exclusivity.  But this, then, is the dilemma of aesthetic experience recast: 
Whereas in the case of fine art the exclusivity that distinguishes it from consumer culture resists 
its own defence—to talk about art is to appeal to qualitative judgement, and yet to defend this 
judgement is to invite accusations of elitism and prejudice—in the case of the natural, its very 
ubiquity and ease thwarts attempts to specify its universality—that is, the crucial significance of 
natural experience is its unprejudiced openness to everyone, but this very openness means that 
each of us is thrown back upon his own exclusive experience, unable to convey the 
20  Adorno (1970), 66. 
21  Hegel (1835-8), 525. 
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universality of this very universal condition.  Just as the experience of sunsets eludes 
photography, the experience of nature evades the mediation—by language, emulsion, or other 
material—that would make it meaningful, and yet it is only by means of this mediation that we 
have any way of saying that there was any experience at all.  Because the experience of nature 
is wholly particular, because the only direct way to share the experience of a sunset is to invite 
others to 'Come, and look!' for themselves, only through culture can we overcome the 
exclusivity of the original experience—the fact that it is constitutively restricted to those present 
at some particular place at some particular time—and redeem its universality. 
It is with this in mind, then, that Adorno claims that '[w]hat nature strives for in vain, 
artworks fulfil: They open our eyes'.22  However, what they open our eyes to is not simply the 
potential universality of aesthetic experience, but also the natural exclusivity that blocks it.  That 
is, what aesthetic objects can do is to open our eyes in the critical way that knowledge does.23  
They can arouse our scepticism, and in this way make us aesthetically cynical.  Now, in that 
cynicism is very often presented as the enemy of aesthetic experience, the appeal to it may 
seem strange.  And yet, it is important to keep in mind the profound hopefulness of all 
cynicism.  We are not cynical unless we fundamentally believe that things could be otherwise, 
and what we are decrying in the case of aesthetic cynicism is the limitedness of our own 
aesthetic experience, the fact that we only have our own.  By opening our eyes to the narrow 
exclusivity of our experience, aesthetic objects can hope to turn us toward that of others.  In 
conclusion, I will address one aesthetic object—in this case a commercial one—that seems to 
attempt this opening up, and consider the film American Beauty. 
In terms of provocative cynicism, this film has no inhibitions.  The main characters are 
callous and materialistic to an appalling degree, so indifferent to others that they make their 
jaded teenage daughter seem a caring soul.  During the film, these 'protagonists' wander from 
one self-indulgence to another, from blackmail to self-prostitution, from adultery to 
paedophilia.  And yet, because we are in no way asked to feel sorry for this couple, we feel no 
pangs when it comes to their undoing, watching avidly as they are reduced to their bare 
humanity.  Nevertheless, we are jarred when they finally reach rock bottom.  Not because we 
22  Adorno (1970), 66. 
23  Because my argument reclaims no fundamental ontological or epistemological privilege for art, there is 
no reason to think that such a critical function must be limited to just its works. 
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suddenly start feeling for them, but rather because we don't.  Lester's chance death is not, as 
our good opinion of ourselves would expect, an occasion for the realisation of our common 
humanity, but rather the stage for ever more spectacle.  We are made uncomfortably aware 
that, like the daughter's boyfriend, we want to stare unashamedly at the creeping crimson pool 
of blood and wonder how beautiful it is.  In this, the film baits our cynicism only to make it turn 
against itself.  We become cynical of our own cynicism, this cynicism that makes us 
indistinguishable from a Lester Burnham.  And as a consequence, we become open to his 
experience, willing to experience his experience as our own.  In this, we catch a glimpse of the 
universality inherent in the exclusivity of aesthetic experience—the fact, that all of us is limited 
to our own.  Like for the dying Lester, very often the experiences that mean the most to us are 
indeed in the nature of 'lying on my back at…scout camp watching falling stars, and yellow 
leaves from the maple trees that lined our street, or my grandmother's hands and the way their 
skin seemed like paper…'24 and yet we can never experience them aesthetically, experience 
them in their universality, except mediately, as the experiences of another. 
This is the case because the flip side of our cynicism is always our sentimental hope for 
community—our attraction to exclusivity inseparable from our desire for a universe in which 
we truly belong.  This is what is at stake in the dilemma of aesthetic experience.  In this light, 
what Nietzsche said in defence of aesthetics over a century ago still has resonance.  It may 
indeed be the case that many find it 'distasteful to see an aesthetic problem taken so 
seriously'25 when there are so many other problems in the world, and yet without aesthetics we 
are in no position to reflect upon the latter's presumed greater seriousness.  Without aesthetics 
we are poorly placed to reflect upon how our exclusive experience can indeed form the basis 









24  American Beauty, Dreamworks, 1999. 
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